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Abstract
We take the Fujita & Thisse (2003) growth-cum-geography model to
investigate the implications of seeing social ties as an important reason
for the generation of knowledge. Moreover, we model migration as an
important channel through which the distance decay e¤ect of cross-
regional knowledge spillovers materialize. Our results show that in
such a setting the full agglomeration of high-skilled workers that are
engaged in R&D activities is not a straightforward outcome. The
equilibrium with an equally dispersed high-skilled labour force is a
stable migration equilibrium, while regions with a larger initial share
of high-skilled workers will only attract more workers when migration
rates are not too high. When social ties are important in generating
knowledge and knowledge spillovers, the full agglomeration of high-
skilled workers in one region is not at all certain. In such a case, growth
is however not optimal. As such, the trade-o¤ between reaching
optimal growth and equal distribution of economic activity remains.
1 Introduction
Migration has many economic and non-economic e¤ects, both for advanced
receiving regions and for less-advanced sending regions. For the less-advanced
Corresponding author. Address: A. de Vaal, Nijmegen School of Management, De-
partment of Economics, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Email:
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sending regions, authors have emphasized the benets of high-potential work-
ers leaving these regions, for instance due to nancial remittances (Khadria,
2000) or through positive knowledge spillovers after migrants returned home
(Kuznetsov and Sabel, 2006). From a sociological perspective, however, one
would also expect that migration inuences the sending regions knowledge
potential when migrants are still abroad. Social relationships are likely to
endure with former colleagues, friends and family members that stay behind,
enhancing knowledge spillovers in the region of origin. Indeed, Singh (2005),
Oettl and Agrawal (2008) and Kerr (2008) nd signicant evidence on a pos-
itive relationship between social bonding and knowledge spillovers, despite
distance weakening e¤ects.
This paper uses a theoretical model to analyse the e¤ect of enduring so-
cial relationships and migration on regional production and growth for an
advanced receiving region and a less-advanced sending region. Our model
combines insights of well-established models on growth and migration, yet
breaks new ground by incorporating social bonding as an important channel
for knowledge spillovers through migration. The basic framework underly-
ing our analysis is the 2-region, 3-sector, 2-factor model by Fujita & Thisse
(2003), in which trade costs, migration of high-skilled workers and regional
growth jointly determine the spatial division of economic activity across
regions. In their analysis, knowledge spillovers are important for regional
growth, yet only indirectly related to migration by a standard distance-decay
e¤ect. We explicitly model the relationship between migration and knowl-
edge spillovers, making it dependent on the migration rate as well as on the
size of the sending region. The former aspect emphasizes that migration is
a prime channel for knowledge spillovers to occur; the latter aspect acknowl-
edges that the impact of social ties depends on how many people move and
how many stay behind.
Our results show that in such a setting the full agglomeration of high-
skilled workers that are engaged in R&D activities is not a straightforward
outcome. The equilibrium with an equally dispersed high-skilled labour force
is a stable migration equilibrium, while regions with a larger initial share of
high-skilled workers will only attract more workers when migration rates are
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not too high. If migration becomes too high, the advantage in numbers
of the larger region is compensated by the disadvantage of benetting less
from knowledge spillovers than the receiving region. When social ties are
important in generating knowledge spillovers, the full agglomeration of high-
skilled workers in one region is not at all certain. In such a case, growth is
however not optimal, so that the trade-o¤ between reaching optimal growth
and equal distribution of economic activity remains.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main
set-up of the Fujita & Thisse (2003) model, as it lays the groundwork for the
analysis to come. Section 3 discusses the importance of social ties for the
generation of knowledge and the implications this has for knowledge spillovers
across regional borders. This section also proposes how to translate these
insights into a modelling framework. Section 4 discusses the implications
for convergence and optimal growth of modelling migration as an important
channel for knowledge spillovers. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Fujita & Thisse (2003) model
The model we employ to show the importance of migration for regional
growth and location of manufacturing is that of Fujita & Thisse, 2003 (hence-
forth Fujita & Thisse). In this section we will briey discuss the main struc-
ture of their model and we will highlight some of their key equations and
results. We use their model because it captures the main elements required
for a discussion on the relevance of migration in a geography-cum-growth
model. Their framework o¤ers an analytically tractable framework where
geography, migration and growth interact to explain regional growth and
income disparities in relation to regional agglomeration patterns.1
The Fujita & Thisse model assumes a two-region, three sector economy,
with two factors of production. We will label the regions R and S, mnemon-
ics for receiving and sending region as will become clear later. The two
1Other papers that have highlighted migration in a geography-cum-growth framework
are Walz (1996), Baldwin and Forslid (2000) and Hirose (2005). These contributions have
in common that they are less tractable then the Fujita & Thisse framework however.
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production factors are low-skilled labour (L) and high-skilled labour (H).
The division of low-skilled workers across regions is even and xed, whereas
the division of high-skilled workers across regions is endogenous, with r and
s = 1   r denoting the respective H-shares of the receiving and sending
region. The three sectors are a traditional sector (T-sector), a manufacturing
sector (M-sector) and an investment good sector (I-sector).
The traditional sector is perfectly competitive, at each point in time pro-
ducing goods with a constant returns to scale technology, using low-skilled
labour only. There are no transportation costs involved in selling T-goods
across regional borders so that the T-sector can serve as numeraire sector.
By appropriate choice of units this implies a wage rate of one for low-skilled
labour in both regions: wr = ws = 1. Each period consumers spend a xed
share 1  of their total expenditures on traditional goods, which is assumed
su¢ ciently large to always sustain production in both regions.
The remaining share  of consumer expenditures is spent on manufac-
turing varieties, which are produced in the M-sector. Consumers exhibit a
Dixit-Stiglitz-like love of variety with  > 1 as the xed elasticity of substitu-
tion. Accordingly, manufacturing varieties are produced under monopolistic
competition and increasing returns to scale. The production of a manufac-
turing variety requires the exclusive use of a patent, which is to be acquired
from the investment good sector. In addition, manufacturing production re-
quires one unit of low-skilled labour to actually produce the good. The total
costs of manufacturing production thus consists of a xed cost that equals
the price paid for the patent and a marginal cost of one, the wage rate of
low-skilled workers. Selling manufacturing output in the other region carries
iceberg-type of transportation costs  > 1: in order to sell an amount q in
the other region, an amount of   q > q must be shipped.
The I-sector provides patents for new manufacturing varieties, using high-
skilled workers only. The productivity of high-skilled workers in producing
patents depends on past ideas and innovations, implying a positive techno-
logical spillover as in Romer (1990). More specically,
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h(j) = M (1)
Ki =
Z i
0
h(j)dj + 
Z 1 i
0
h(j)dj
1=
(2)
= M [i + (1  i)]1=
ni = Kii: (3)
for i = r; s. In these equations, h(j) denotes personal knowledge of high-
skilled workers, which is the same in both regions by its dependence on the
world-wide number of manufacturing varieties M . The parameter  is a
general productivity parameter of individual learning. The production of
patents in a region is n. It depends on the number of high-skilled workers
involved in the regions I-sector, indicated by i,2 as well as on the produc-
tivity of each worker Ki. The latter is the regional knowledge stock, which
is the result of complementary interaction between all high-skilled workers
(0 <  < 1), wherever they reside. However, there is a xed distance decay
e¤ect regarding the contribution of the personal knowledge of high-skilled
workers from the other region: 0    1.
Equations (1)-(2) imply that individual learning is perfect and indepen-
dent of where high-skilled workers reside, but that high-skilled productiv-
ity in generating patents is region-specic, as in localized spillovers mod-
els. This has important implications for optimal growth in the Fujita &
Thisse model. In the Fujita & Thisse framework the growth rate of the
economy depends on the number of newly-created manufacturing varieties:
_M=M = g(r) = [rKr(r) + (1  r)Ks(r)] =M . With imperfect knowl-
edge spillovers, this implies that the growth of M will be highest when all
high-skilled workers agglomerate in one region, that is when either r or s
is one. When high-skilled workers are fully dispersed, growth is lowest. This
makes migration vital for reaching optimal growth in the Fujita & Thisse
framework.
Where high-skilled workers will locate depends on the real wage they will
2The total mass of high-skilled workers is set to one, Hr +Hs = 1.
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receive, as customary in new economic geography models.3 Since only the
high-skilled work in the I-sector, and assuming free entry and exit of rms in
the I-sector, high-skilled wages are directly related to the price of a patent.
The market price of a patent i should equal the unit costs of producing a
patent. Hence,
wi = iKi(i)
is the equilibrium wage of high-skilled workers in either region, which depends
on the price of the patent as well as on high-skilled productivity.
The real wage also depends on the location of manufacturing production
though. Since M-goods carry transportation costs, regions producing more
manufacturing varieties will have a lower price index, making it attractive for
high-skilled labour to migrate to that region. The location decision of man-
ufacturing rms, in turn, depends on consumer expenditures. Firms prefer
being close to their potential market, to save on transportation costs. The
migration of high-skilled workers to a region therefore makes it attractive
for manufacturing rms to move there as well, which is the demand-linked
cumulative causation e¤ect that is so common to new economic geography
models. On the other hand, low-skilled labour is immobile across regions so
that some transportation costs will always have to be incurred. Moreover,
transportation costs implies a better shield against foreign competition the
smaller a region, and this market-crowding e¤ect makes it attractive to lo-
cate in the smaller region. Depending on the level of trade costs, therefore,
the market-crowding e¤ect may dominate the demand-linked circular causal-
ity e¤ect, as customary in new economic geography models. The location
of patent production is irrelevant to the location decision of manufacturing
rms. Patents are assumed to be freely transmittable across regions and
once the patent has been acquired, the manufacturing rm can choose freely
where to locate. As such, Fujita & Thisse nd that when transportation
costs are high, manufacturing production will always take place in both re-
3Apart from wages, high-skilled workers also own assets in the form of shares in man-
ufacturing rms. However, as will become clear, the holding of assets is irrelevant for the
location decision of high-skilled workers.
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gions, irrespective of the division of high-skilled workers. For su¢ ciently low
transportation costs manufacturing production tends to agglomerate in the
region that has the higher share of high-skilled labour.
Apart from being a new economic geography framework, the Fujita &
Thisse model also features growth, requiring insight in how consumers de-
termine their optimal consumption paths and how this depends on patent
production and migration decisions. Fujita & Thisse (2003: 125-126) assume
that all consumers choose an expenditure path "j(t); j = L;H whereas the
mobile high-skilled consumers also choose an optimal location path rH(t) 2
fR;Sg. Indirect utility at time t is given by j(t) = "j(t)[Pij(t)(t)]  for all
consumers, with Pij(t) the price index of the M-good in region of residence.
However, moving between regions incurs a psychological cost C(t) that is
expressed in units of lifetime utility. This implies lifetime utility of
Uj =
Z 1
0
e t ln[vj(t)]dt 
X
h
e tC(th);
where the latter part is only relevant for high-skilled workers and where
 > 0 is the subjective discount rate that is the same for all consumers.
Preferences are intertemporal CES with unit elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution. High-skilled workers are assumed to hold assets as well, which
takes the form of an equal share in all manufacturing rms. Low-skilled
worker do not hold assets. The assets yield an interest rate v(t) that is de-
termined in perfectly competitive bond markets that is freely accessible to all
consumers, wherever they reside. Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995:
66) the intertemporal budget constraint is written as:Z 1
0
"j(t)e
 v(t)tdt = aj +Wj(0); j = L;H
with aL = 0 and aH > 0. Wj(0) =
R1
0
e v(t)twrj(t)(t)dt is the present value
of the consumers wage income over time. Note that for low-skilled workers
w = 1 at all times in both regions. For any given location path, the optimal
consumption path is governed by the familiar Euler condition, _"j(t)="j(t) =
(t)   . Since this must hold for all consumers, this also determines the
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aggregate expenditure path _E(t)=E(t).
Given this set-up, and under the expectation that migration takes place
to the receiving region R, Fujita & Thisse show that the migration rate of
high-skilled workers at time t is governed by:
_(t) =


et ln

aH +W (0; t)
aH +W (0; T )

  et
Z T
t
e t ln

Pr(z)
Ps(z)

dz (4)
where T is the point in time beyond which high-skilled labourers would not
want to postpone migration and where  is the speed of adjustment in work-
ersmigration. The equation essentially says that migration depends on a
comparison of real returns between moving to R at time t and T , under the
expectation that high-skilled workers indeed move from S to R.
This nalizes the set-up of the Fujita & Thisse model. Focusing on steady
state growth paths the next step is to determine how the location of man-
ufacturing production and high-skilled workers interact to explain persis-
tent income divergence across regions. Their results are summarized in two
propositions. Proposition 1 (Fujita & Thisse, 2003: 140) shows that when
patents are freely mobile, only stable spatial congurations can be attained
that involve full agglomeration of high-skilled labour in one region. Provided
transportation costs are su¢ ciently low, also manufacturing production will
agglomerate in that region. For higher transportation costs manufacturing
production is dispersed, but with the major share in the region where high-
skilled labour agglomerated. Proposition 2 (Fujita & Thisse, 2003: 143)
deals with the welfare e¤ects for the workers in both regions, establishing a
trade-o¤ between standard new economic geography core-periphery welfare
e¤ects of high-skilled agglomeration and optimal growth e¤ects. If the ad-
ditional growth boosted by agglomerating R&D in one region is su¢ ciently
large, such core-periphery growth paths Pareto-dominate growth paths with
a symmetrically dispersed R&D sector for all types of labour involved (low-
skilled labour, skilled labour in R and skilled labour in S).
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3 Knowledge spillovers and social ties
The key point of departure for this paper is the importance of social ties in
generating knowledge and its consequences for knowledge spillovers across re-
gional boundaries. In general, individuals learn by getting formal education
or by gathering practical experience. However, they also prot from knowl-
edge spillovers that arise from the nonrival public good nature of knowledge
(Arrow, 1962). By building systems through which individuals can acquire
knowledge, societies unintentionally enlarge individual knowledge by gener-
ating knowledge spillovers.
The existence of knowledge spillovers is well understood in the literature
on regional growth disparities. Knowledge spillovers are seen key to generat-
ing growth and explaining growth di¤erences across regions. The extent to
which knowledge spills over across regions is typically related to geographical
distance by adding a distance decay e¤ect. Empirical evidence suggests that
knowledge spillovers seem to be geographically localized (e.g. Ja¤e et al.,
1993; Asheim and Gertler, 2005). This has been taken up in models linking
new economic geography and growth by adding distance decay e¤ects to the
extent to which knowledge can cross regional boundaries. In new-economic-
geography-cum-growth literature this has amounted to a parameterization of
regional knowledge spillovers that allows for a specication where knowledge
spillovers are purely local (local spillover models) and specications that
exhibit perfect interregional knowledge spillovers (global spillover models),
see Baldwin et al. (2003) for an overview and details of specication. The
Fujita & Thisse (2003) framework clearly ts in that tradition.
A possible explanation for the localization of knowledge spillovers is that
scientists create knowledge in such a way that parts of it remain unclear for
other scientists, rms or workers (Polanyi, 1966). Knowledge has thus two
parts: a codied part and a non-codied part (Agrawal, 2006). The codied
elements are easily accessible and applicable to others in society and could
easily spill over. The non-codied elements are harder to absorb. Some
parts remain tacit, either because the scientist lacks the incentive to codify
all knowledge, or because it is impossible to do so (Powell and Swart, 2005).
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To be able to fully use this knowledge requires direct interaction with its
creator, which is obviously easier when you are (geographically) close to that
person.
The importance of geographical proximity is even greater when taking
into account sociological views on interaction, which assert that the ease of
interaction is related to the sense of social belonging that individuals ex-
perience. Each group of persons that is geographically close has a natural
urge to form its own imagined community(Anderson, 1983), in which for
every community certain specic ground rules and behaviour exists. As a
result, all societies will claim to be di¤erent from one another, giving rise to
a sense of usversus them. Being in the same community improves in-
teraction, as individuals will understand each others way of reasoning better
than individuals from di¤erent societies would.
This notion is conrmed by Paasi (1996) with his analytical framework
that bases forms of socio-spatial integration and distinction on di¤ering re-
gional identities. The identity of a region is mostly expressed in structures
of expectations; it weaves together elements which are signicant in the in-
stitutions and habits of a region. Basically, residents of a region act in a
regular fashion and thus knowledge acquisition and creation of knowledge
occurs in a distinctive way. The notion of regional identity enables to con-
struct a classication between current residents of a region and people living
outside the region. Paasi identies two scales of socio-spatial integration; on
the one hand there is ones original identity (thus weor other), on the
other hand there is ones current location (thus hereor there). The com-
bination of these two scales yields four options of socio-spatial integration;
the rst two options deal with original residents of both hereand there,
while the other two deal with migrants, who have entered the other region.
At some point in time regional identities of the two regions become inter-
woven, as the residents of both regions become less and less distinct from
the migrants entering their region, which is due to increasing interaction and
mutual understanding.
This implies that regional knowledge stocks can be di¤erent in content
at rst, due to di¤erent regional identities, inhibiting instantaneous learning
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from regions that are not geographically close. Moreover, since commu-
nication. . . is taken as the basis of knowledge (Nooteboom, 1993), to be
able to transfer the tacit parts of the knowledge stock also requires mutual
understanding. Both economists (Glaeser et al., 2002; Knack and Keefer,
1997) and sociologists (Granovetter, 1973; Coleman, 1988) claim that strong
ties amongst individuals lower the costs to exchange information, not only
because of access to previously established networks of knowledge, but also
since reputations are built when individuals frequently interact. Empirical
evidence for the role of communication for knowledge spillovers is provided
by Singh (2005), Oettl and Agrawal (2008) and Kerr (2008). All of them
conclude that enduring social ties between individuals stimulate knowledge
spillovers between regions.
With social ties being of crucial importance for the cross-regional oc-
currence of knowledge spillovers, migration becomes an important channel
through which the distance decay e¤ect of knowledge spillovers can be over-
come. When people move to another region, mutual understanding will be
stimulated through explicit communication with the previously denounced
otherregion. Through migration, knowledge of the other region becomes
accessible. This holds both for the region of immigration, where migrants
bring their knowledge and communicate about it with the locals, as well as
for the region of emigration. Especially if migrants retain their social rela-
tionships with those they leave behind, their newly acquired knowledge will
spill over to their old region. Agrawal et al. (2008) empirically investigate the
importance of socially induced knowledge spillovers. Using patent citation
data, the authors nd a substitution e¤ect between spatial proximity and so-
cial proximity. While co-location facilitates knowledge spillovers, co-ethnicity
plays a signicant role in knowledge di¤usion when distance increases. The
marginal increase in knowledge spillovers between ethnically related inven-
tors living 1,000 miles apart is equal to 5 percent, while a distance of 3,000
miles increases the degree of knowledge spillovers by 13 percent. Thus, there
exists an empirical justication to add social ties as di¤usion channel for
knowledge.
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To incorporate these ndings in the Fujita & Thisse model in a sensible
manner requires striking the right balance between analytical rigour and
tractability. As such, we retain the main set-up of the Fujita & Thisse model,
yet propose a di¤erent handling of how knowledge spillovers occur, relating
it explicitly to migration. Our proposed changes relate to the individual
learning specication, equation (1), as well as to migrations function as an
important channel for the transmission of knowledge from abroad, equation
(2). The way regional knowledge stocks a¤ect high-skilled productivity and
patent production remains as in Fujita & Thisse.
Regarding individual learning we assume, in line with the above, that
learning implies getting to understand both the tacit and codied component
of existing knowledge. Regarding tacit knowledge we relate this to social
interaction with the local labour force, while learning the codied knowledge
part is modelled by relating it to the manufacturing varieties that are around.
Attaching a weight 0    1 to indicate the relative importance of these
two components, we get:
hi(j) = 

iM
1 : (5)
where all variables are as before except that we add a subscript i = r; s to
h(j) since social ties imply that individual learning is (partly) region specic.
Equation (5) says that individuals learn about the tacit component of knowl-
edge from social interaction with residents from their own region, while they
also learn from the codied knowledge that is implicit in each manufacturing
variety. It includes Fujita & Thisses (2003) specication as a special case
( = 0).
As in Fujita & Thisse the human capital stock of societies is based on an
accumulation of individual knowledges. However, to benet from knowledge
from the other region migration is required. Hence,
Kr =
Z r
0
hr(j)
dj + r
Z s
0
hs(j)
dj
1=
(6)
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Ks =
Z s
0
hs(j)
dj + s
Z r
0
hr(j)
dj
1=
; (7)
where 0  r; s  1 are region-specic distance decay e¤ects that depend
on migration.4 The exact specication of i requires some thought. First, 
should rely on the migration rate, for that is the main channel through which
knowledge spills over from other regions in our framework. When migration
increases more knowledge can be transmitted, while zero migration would
imply that no knowledge spillovers can be reaped. Second, one incoming
worker is unlikely to make a substantial di¤erence in the receiving region,
but its impact on the region of origin will be more substantial. Here social
ties come into play, which are more prominent the smaller the sending region
is. What is learned in the new region may then be easily shared with old
friends and colleagues who stayed at home.5 Consequently, the level of 
should depend on the size of a region. The larger the receiving region, the less
substantial will be the impact of incoming migrants. By contrast, outgoing
migration will have a smaller impact the larger the sending region. The larger
the group left behind, the less likely it is that knowledge spills over from the
receiving to the sending region. Finally, we want  to be maximally one to
ensure that the knowledge stock cannot be larger than would be the case
when all high-skilled workers live in one region.
These considerations are satised by the following specication for :
r = _s  (1  r) and s = _s  (1 + s)r: (8)
It establishes that the knowledge stock of a region consists of individual
4While empirical literature shows distance matters for the magnitude of knowledge
spillovers, e.g. Ja¤e et al. (1993) and Asheim and Gertler (2005), we will ignore distance
in absolute terms in the remainder of the analysis. Socially induced knowledge spillovers
work as a way to overcome mental distance, and as such leave absolute distance relatively
unimportant for knowledge di¤usion, as conrmed by the analysis of Agrawal et al. (2008).
5We do not di¤erentiate between the degree of social ties here. It does not matter in
the model whether high-skilled workers are socially tied on direct relationships (family,
former work colleagues or classmates) or on indirect relationships (graduated at the same
university, common friends). The model tries to establish the e¤ect of social ties on regional
disparities, and the current setup su¢ ces to deliver some new insights.
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knowledges of the own region and that of other regions, provided there
is migration that helps to overcome incongruities in understanding and/or
knowledge bases. When _s is zero, no spillovers occur, while s > r for
all levels of r and s.6 For the receiving region labeled r, this implies that
the skilled workers from abroad take with them the knowledge stock from
their region of origin, which may benet the new location. Yet, one worker
is unlikely to make a substantial di¤erence, implying that the knowledge
spillovers to be reached depend on the extent of incoming migration. Exactly
the opposite might occur for the region from which the migrant has left, the
sending region s. Due to strong social ties, what is learned in the new region
of residence may easily be shared with old friends and colleagues who stayed
at home.7 It then matters for the extent of knowledge spillovers how many
stay behind. The larger the group left behind, the more likely it is that
knowledge spills over from the receiving to the sending region.
Substituting for (5) in (6) and (7) yields the nal equations for the regional
knowledge stocks:
Ki =M
1 
h
1+i + i(1  i)1+
i1=
i = r; s: (9)
where we applied r + s = 1 and put  = 1 for convenience. For notational
convenience we dene ki 
h
1+i + i(1  i)1+
i1=
for i = r; s so that
Ki =M
1 ki. The equation shows some resemblance with equation (2), Fu-
jita & Thisses equation for regional knowledge stocks. It di¤ers clearly how-
ever regarding the way knowledge spillovers occur between regions, reserving
a central role for migration. Moreover, we have supplied a micro-foundation
for the region-specicity of knowledge stocks.
6Note that this would imply that once people have migrated their potential to act as a
channel for spillovers ceases to exist. The implicit assumption therefore is that social ties
only play a role during or just after the actual migration phase. This assumption is however
not restrictive in steady-state migration equilibrium, as this requires zero migration.
7We do not di¤erentiate between the degree of social ties here. It does not matter in
the model whether high-skilled workers are socially tied on direct relationships (family,
former work colleagues or classmates) or on indirect relationships (graduated at the same
university, common friends). The model tries to establish the e¤ect of social ties on regional
disparities, and the current setup su¢ ces to deliver some new insights.
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4 Migration, social ties and regional conver-
gence
In the Fujita & Thisse framework growth would be optimal if all high-skilled
labour agglomerates in one region. We will now verify to what extent this is
also true when migration is an important channel for knowledge to spill over.
In the model used, growth is related to the generation of new manufacturing
varieties world wide and, since patents are footloose, therefore relies on the
production of patents in both regions. Hence,
g = _M=M =M 
h
rkr(r; _s) + sks(r; _s)
i
(10)
since _M = (nr + ns) =
P
i iKi: Equation (10) implies that also in the
migration-induced knowledge spillover model the growth rate of manufactur-
ing varieties is highest when all high-skilled agglomerate in one region. This
is a logical outcome in view of imperfect cross-regional knowledge spillovers.
The question is therefore to what extent will high-skilled workers fully ag-
glomerate in one region?
The answer to this question lies in an investigation of the stability of the
dispersed equilibria as in new economic geography models: for each value of
0  r  1 it must be checked whether this is an equilibrium that involves
no (further) migration, and, if so, whether this is a stable equilibrium in
the sense that a small additional movement of labour would imply migration
ows that lead back to r. To shed light on this issue we recall that migrants
essentially compare the real returns between moving to the receiving region
R and staying in the sending region S, where real wages also depend on
the location of manufacturing production. The introduction of social ties
as an important factor for knowledge accumulation does not alter this basic
mechanism. Moreover, the Fujita & Thisse framework incorporates migration
costs that increases in the rate of migration, which can be interpreted as
resembling increased costs of leaving ones social network.8 In steady-state
8Not quite, of course, as a better proxy for it would be to include the number of
inhabitants staying behind. Fujita & Thisse interpret the dependence of migration costs
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equilibrium, where workers choose to not longer migrate, the comparison of
real returns of migration therefore boils down to:
r
s
=
 + kr(r)
 + ks(s)

Pr(t)
Ps(t)
 
 (r) (11)
where it has been assumed that migration takes place from region S to region
R. In (11) j(t) = "j(t)[Pij(t)(t)]
  is indirect utility at time t and individ-
ual expenditure "j(t) equals a() [ + ki(i)] in region i = r; s, with a(:)
denoting total asset value of manufacturing rms (see Fujita & Thisse, 2003:
136-7 for further details). Steady state equilibrium implies that (r) = 1.
Equation (11) makes explicit that the willingness to migrate depends
on the relative productivity of high-skilled workers in both regions as well
as on relative price indices. In the Fujita & Thisse framework, kr=ks is
symmetric around r = 1=2, implying that kr R ks , r R 1=2: Hence,
in their model the fully dispersed equilibrium is a steady-state equilibrium,
since with both high-skilled and low-skilled labour evenly distributed across
regions, also manufacturing rms will be evenly distributed, making regional
price indices the same as well.
By contrast, in our framework social ties imply that migration a¤ects the
receiving and sending region di¤erently. Though for positive migration rates,
s(1=2) > r(1=2) also kr(1=2) < ks(1=2), which implies that an equal divi-
sion of labour across regions cannot be a steady-state migration equilibrium,
unless migration is zero. And that is exactly what will be the case. Unlike
the Fujita & Thisse framework, when a small number of high-skilled workers
move towards region R, kr < ks making such a move inconsistent in expec-
tations. In new economic geography terms: r = 1=2 is a stable spreading
equilibrium. A formal condition settling this, assuming that manufacturing
is equally spread across regions (hence Ps = Pr) and using the denitions of
ki, is:9
on migration rates as a reection of increased costs of nding housing and employment in
the new region of residence.
9It is convenient to rewrite kr to
"
1  s
s
 s
1+
+ rs
1+
#1=
when doing the
calculations.
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kr R ks ,
8>><>>:
_s R _s(r) for r < r < 1=2
_s Q _s(r) for r < r < 1
(12)
where _s(r)  1  [r=s]
1+
(1  r)  (1 + s)r [r=s]1+
and where r is the value
for r at which the denominator of _s(r) switches sign.10 Since _s(1=2) = 0,
any positive migration at r = 1=2 implies kr < ks. Moreover, since _s(1) = 0
and _s(0) = 1, the other regional distribution that is consistent with a steady-
state equilibrium entailing zero migration and a symmetric distribution of
manufacturing activity is when all high-skilled agglomerate in the receiving
region, that is when r = 1:11
Proposition 1 When social ties are important for knowledge generation and
when knowledge spillovers across regions depend on migration, an equilibrium
with symmetric spreading of high-skilled labour is a stable migration equilib-
rium.
When r deviates from 1/2, however, high-skilled workers may want to
agglomerate in one region. We recall in this respect that condition (12) has
been derived under the assumption that high-skilled labour migrates towards
the receiving region. In the Fujita & Thisse model this assumption is con-
sistent with r > 1=2. Since in their framework the spreading of high-skilled
labour is never a stable equilibrium, this assumption always holds: a slight
deviation of r above 1=2 for whatever reason, implies migration towards
region r until all high-skilled have moved there. The region with the size
advantage is also the region of immigration. This is clearly di¤erent in our
framework. As (12) makes clear, when manufacturing activity is symmetri-
cally dispersed across regions, only migration rates below _s(r) are consis-
tent with enduring migration to R as the larger region. If migration becomes
10Numerical simulations show that r is lower that 1/2 for all values of  and , hovering
around a value of r = 0:45.
11Which could be either of the two regions of course. Which region is actually the
receiving region is completely endogenous in our model.
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too high, the advantage in numbers of the larger region R is compensated
by the disadvantage of benetting less from knowledge spillovers than the
receiving region (r < s). In the migration-induced spillovers model it is
not at all certain that the larger region will be the immigrant region.
But there are more implications from (12). To make these clear, it is
helpful to use a graph. To that end, Figure 1 portrays condition (12) as a
function of the initial distribution of high-skilled labour across regions. The
graph has been drawn for  = 0:8 and  = 0:5 but is representative of all pos-
sible combinations of these values. The dark, solid lines give the migration
rates for which kr = ks. The relative magnitudes of kr and ks with respect
to these lines are as indicated by the text boxes. Note that the relevant area
for consideration in the graph is for migration rates between 0 and 1. The
lines highlight that to become an attractive region for migration, it is indeed
not enough to be the larger region. Migration to the larger region R will
only occur when the migration rate does not surpass a certain threshold of
migration, to make the productivity gain in the receiving region not higher
than in the sending region. This stands in sharp contrast to the Fujita &
Thisse analysis, where migration does not play a role in determining knowl-
edge spillovers. In their case, kr R ks () r R 1=2, which is independent of
the migration rate.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
Whats more, however, is that Figure 1 also indicates that if region R is
initially the smaller region, that is when r < 1=2, it actually becomes the
sending region. To verify what this implies, warranting substitution of s in kr
and r in ks in the derivation of _s(r), Figure 1 also portrays condition (12)
that is consistent with R being the sending region. This is the dashed, grey
line in Figure 1.12 The underlined text boxes indicate the relative positions
of kr, ks with respect to this line. It appears that situations with r < 1=2
12In that case, the denominator of _s(r) becomes (1 + s)r   (1   r) [r=s]1+
while the condition itself remains the same. The value for r changes though and becomes
much higher (around 0,9).
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are in most instances consistent with seeing R as a sending region. Only
values of r just below 1=2 require that migration is not too high.
Combining these insights, it thus appears that the sending region cannot
be the initially larger region, for that would imply ks > kr. This is consistent
with the idea that to be attractive for migration, a region should have an
advantage, which in new economic geography-like frameworks is regional size.
However, for a larger region to be an immigrant region, immigration rates
should not be too high.
Proposition 2 When social ties are important for knowledge generation and
when knowledge spillovers across regions depend on migration, regions should
have a size advantage to become an immigrant region. A larger region only
becomes an immigrant region if migration rates are below the threshold level
_s(r).
Propositions 1 and 2 have been derived for an equal division of manufac-
turing activity across regions, that is for Mr = Ms and Pr = Ps. In general
this might not be true of course. However, in the Fujita & Thisse frame-
work, as well as in ours, the decision of manufacturing rms where to locate
stands in close relation to the location of high-skilled workers  only high-
skilled labour is mobile across regions. Since by Proposition 1 the symmetric
spreading of high-skilled labour is a stable equilibrium, also the symmetric
equilibrium spreading of manufacturing activity will be a stable equilibrium.
Hence, in contrast to the Fujita & Thisse framework, and independent of
transportation costs (see below), the symmetric equilibrium involves both
spreading of manufacturing activity and high-skilled labour across regions.
When migration is an important channel for knowledge to spill over, identical
regions are a spatial long-run equilibrium.
Proposition 3 When social ties are important for knowledge generation and
when knowledge spillovers across regions depend on migration, initially iden-
tical regions are a stable equilibrium.
In reality regions are unlikely to be identical initially, warranting an analy-
sis of stability when regions are initially slightly divergent, for instance when
19
r = 0:6. The situation will then be di¤erent since it can not longer be as-
sumed that manufacturing rms will be evenly spread across regions initially.
It must therefore be veried whether also in such a situation full convergence
is a long-run outcome.
With a larger fraction of the high-skilled labour force initially living in
region R, also overall expenditures will be higher in region R. Consequently,
it may pay o¤ for manufacturing rms to locate where the market is largest,
for instance to save on transportation costs. On the other hand, with more
manufacturing rms being located in one region, wages for low-skilled workers
will be bid up where they must remain equal in nominal terms. This implies
that the price index in the larger region must be higher for both regions
to sustain some manufacturing activity. In the model we employ here, the
mechanisms driving the location of manufacturing rms are the same as in
the Fujita & Thisse model. From their analysis we obtain
Pr(t)
Ps(t)
=

Es(r)
Er(r)
1=( 1)
(13)
as the market outcome when manufactures are produced in both regions
(Mr > 0; Ms > 0). This equation holds as long as relative regional expendi-
ture falls within certain limits that are related to the level of transportation
costs. More specically, it holds when  < Er=Es < 1= where 0 <  < 1
denotes a freeness of trade parameter that is monotonically and inversely
related to the iceberg transportation costs.13.
The expenditure ratio is given by
Er(r)
Es(r)
=
L=2 + ra
(r)[ + kr(r)]
L=2 + sa(r)[ + ks(r)]
where a(:) is the total asset value of manufacturing rms, which are owned
by high-skilled labour (Fujita & Thisse: 134-135). Following their analysis,
while applying our specications for kr and ks, yields:
13To be precise,    ( 1).
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Er
Es
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 +
2
   
 + 
1=
r
 +M 1=r
=
 + 
    (r = 1)
1 (r = 1=2)"
1 +
2
   
 + 
1=
s
 +M 1=s
# 1
=
   
 + 
(r = 0)
(14)
which are exactly identical to the expressions in Fujita & Thisses since r(1)
and s(0) are zero in the zero migration equilibrium. The spreading of manu-
facturing rms across regions thus sustains the stability of the zero-migration
equilibria. Combining (13) and (14), we see that when all high-skilled work-
ers reside in region R (S), Pr=Ps < (>) 1. Moreover, when r = 1=2 price
indices are the same. It is therefore labour migration that drives long-run
outcomes so that even when regions are di¤erent initially, convergence can
be a long-run stable outcome.
5 Conclusion
We have taken the Fujita & Thisse (2003) growth-cum-geography model to
investigate the implications of seeing social ties as a main reason for the gen-
eration of knowledge and migration as an important channel through which
the distance decay e¤ect of cross-regional knowledge spillovers materializes.
Our results show that in such a setting the full agglomeration of high-skilled
workers that are engaged in R&D activities is not a straightforward out-
come. The equilibrium with an equally dispersed high-skilled labour force
is a stable migration equilibrium, while regions with a larger initial share of
high-skilled workers will only attract more workers when migration rates are
not too high. If migration becomes too high, the advantage in numbers of
the larger region is compensated by the disadvantage of benetting less from
knowledge spillovers than the receiving region. When social ties are impor-
tant in generating knowledge spillovers, the full agglomeration of high-skilled
workers in one region is not at all certain. In such a case, growth is however
21
not optimal, so that the trade-o¤between reaching optimal growth and equal
distribution of economic activity remains.
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Figure 1: Threshold migration levels
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